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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-119
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WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
PETITIONER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY,
Jr., CO.
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of wisconsin
[June 19, 1992]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Section 101(a) of Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959),
15 U. S. C. 381, prohibits a State from taxing the income
of a corporation whose only business activities within the
State consist of -solicitation of orders- for tangible goods,
provided that the orders are sent outside the State for
approval and the goods are delivered from out-of-state.  The
issue in this case is whether respondent's activities in
Wisconsin fell outside the protection of this provision.
                      I
  Respondent William Wrigley, Jr., Co. is the world's
largest manufacturer of chewing gum.  Based in Chicago, it
sells gum nationwide through a marketing system that
divides the country into districts, regions, and territories.
During the relevant period (1973-1978), the Midwestern
district included a Milwaukee region, covering most of
Wisconsin and parts of other States, which was subdivided
into several geographic territories.
  The district manager for the Midwestern district had his
residence and company office in Illinois, and visited
Wisconsin only six to nine days each year, usually for a
sales meeting or to call on a particularly important account.
The regional manager of the Milwaukee region resided in
Wisconsin, but Wrigley did not provide him with a company
office.  He had general responsibility for sales activities in
the region, and would typically spend 80-95% of his time
working with the sales representatives in the field or
contacting certain -key- accounts.  The remainder of his
time was devoted to administrative activities, including
writing and reviewing company reports, recruiting new
sales representatives, making recommendations to the
district manager concerning the hiring, firing, and compen-
sation of sales representatives, and evaluating their
performance.  He would preside at full-day sales strategy
meetings for all regional sales representatives once or twice
a year.  The manager from 1973 to 1976, John Kroyer,
generally held these meetings in the -office- he maintained
in the basement of his home, whereas his successor, Gary
Hecht, usually held them at a hotel or motel.  (Kroyer
claimed income tax deductions for this office, but Wrigley
did not reimburse him for it, though it provided a filing
cabinet.)  Mr. Kroyer also intervened two or three times a
year to help arrange a solution to credit disputes between
the Chicago office and important local accounts.  Mr. Hecht
testified that he never engaged in such activities, although
Wrigley's formal position description for regional sales
manager continued to list as one of the assigned duties
-[r]epresent[ing] the company on credit problems as
necessary.-
  The sales or -field- representatives in the Milwaukee
region, each of whom was assigned his own territory,
resided in Wisconsin.  They were provided with company
cars, but not with offices.  They were also furnished a stock
of gum (with an average wholesale value of about $1000),
a supply of display racks, and promotional literature.
These materials were kept at home, except that one
salesman, whose apartment was too small, rented storage
space at about $25 per month, for which he was reimbursed
by Wrigley.
  On a typical day, the sales representative would load up
the company car with a supply of display racks and several
cases of gum, and would visit accounts within his territory.
In addition to handing out promotional materials and free
samples, and directly requesting orders of Wrigley products,
he would engage in a number of other activities which
Wrigley asserts were designed to promote sales of its
products.  He would, for example, provide free display racks
to retailers (perhaps several on any given day), and would
seek to have these new racks, as well as pre-existing ones,
prominently located.  The new racks were usually filled
from the retailer's existing stock of Wrigley gum, but it
would sometimes happen-perhaps once a month-that the
retailer had no Wrigley products on hand and did not want
to wait until they could be ordered from the wholesaler.  In
that event, the rack would be filled from the stock of gum
in the salesman's car.  This gum, which would have a retail
value of $15 to $20, was not provided without charge.  The
representative would issue an -agency stock check- to the
retailer, indicating the quantity supplied; he would send a
copy of this to the Chicago office or to the wholesaler, and
the retailer would ultimately be billed (by the wholesaler)
in the proper amount.
  When visiting a retail account, Wrigley's sales representa-
tive would also check the retailer's stock of gum for fresh-
ness, and would replace stale gum at no cost to the retailer.
This was a regular part of a representative's duties, and at
any given time up to 40% of the stock of gum in his
possession would be stale gum that had been removed from
retail stores.  After accumulating a sufficient amount of
stale product, the representative either would ship it back
to Wrigley's Chicago office or would dispose of it at a local
Wisconsin landfill.
  Wrigley did not own or lease real property in Wisconsin,
did not operate any manufacturing, training, or warehouse
facility, and did not have a telephone listing or bank
account.  All Wisconsin orders were sent to Chicago for
acceptance, and were filled by shipment through common
carrier from outside the State.  Credit and collection
activities were similarly handled by the Chicago office.
Although Wrigley engaged in print, radio, and television
advertising in Wisconsin, the purchase and placement of
that advertising was managed by an independent advertis-
ing agency located in Chicago.
  Wrigley had never filed tax returns or paid taxes in
Wisconsin; indeed, it was not licensed to do business in that
State.  In 1980, petitioner Wisconsin Department of Rev-
enue concluded that the company's in-state business activ-
ities during the years 1973-1978 had been sufficient to
support imposition of a franchise tax, and issued a tax
assessment on a percentage of the company's apportionable
income for those years.  Wrigley objected to the assessment,
maintaining that its Wisconsin activities were limited to
-solicitation of orders- within the meaning of 15 U. S. C.
381, and that it was therefore immune from Wisconsin
franchise taxes.  After an evidentiary hearing, the Wiscon-
sin Tax Appeals Commission unanimously upheld the
imposition of the tax.  CCH Wis. Tax Rptr. -202-792
(1986).  It later reaffirmed this decision, with one commis-
sioner dissenting, after the County Circuit Court vacated
the original order on procedural grounds.  CCH Wis. Tax.
Rptr. -202-926 (1987).  The County Circuit Court then
reversed on the merits, CCH Wis. Tax Rptr.  -203-000
(1988), but that decision was in turn reversed by the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting.  153
Wis. 2d 559, 451 N. W. 2d 444 (1989).  The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed yet once
again, thus finally disallowing the Wisconsin tax.  160
Wis. 2d 53, 465 N. W. 2d 800 (1991).  We granted the
State's petition for certiorari, 502 U. S. ___ (1991).
                     II
  In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minneso-
ta, 358 U. S. 450, 454 (1959), we considered Minnesota's
imposition of a properly apportioned tax on the net income
of an Iowa cement corporation whose -activities in Minneso-
ta consisted of a regular and systematic course of solicita-
tion of orders for the sale of its products, each order being
subject to acceptance, filling and delivery by it from its
plant [in Iowa].-  The company's salesmen, operating out of
a three-room office in Minneapolis rented by their employer,
solicited purchases by cement dealers and by customers of
cement dealers.  They also received complaints about goods
that had been lost or damaged in shipment, and forwarded
these back to Iowa for further instructions.  Id., at 454-455.
The cement company's contacts with Minnesota were
otherwise very limited; it had no bank account, real
property, or warehoused merchandise in the State.  We
nonetheless rejected Commerce Clause and due process
challenges to the tax:
-We conclude that net income from the interstate
operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to
state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory
and is properly apportioned to local activities within
the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the
same.-  Id., at 452.
  The opinion in Northwestern States was handed down in
February 1959.  Less than a week later, we granted a
motion to dismiss (apparently on mootness grounds) the
appeal of a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that had
rejected due process and Commerce Clause challenges to
the imposition of state net-income taxes based on local
solicitation of orders that were sent out-of-state for approval
and shipping.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector
of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal
dism'd, 359 U. S. 28 (1959).  That decision was particularly
significant because, unlike the Iowa cement company in
Northwestern States, the Kentucky liquor company in
Brown-Forman did not lease (or own) any real estate in the
taxing state.  Rather, its activities were limited to
-the presence of `missionary men' who call upon whole-
sale dealers [in Louisiana] and who, on occasion,
accompany the salesmen of these wholesalers to assist
them in obtaining a suitable display of appellant's
merchandise at the business establishments of said
retailers . . . .-  234 La., at 653-654, 101 So. 2d, at 70.
Two months later, we denied certiorari in another Louisi-
ana case upholding the imposition of state tax on the
income of an out-of-state corporation that neither leased nor
owned real property in Louisiana and whose only activities
in that State -consist[ed] of the regular and systematic
solicitation of orders for its product by fifteen salesmen.-
International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 280, 107
So. 2d 640, 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 984 (1959).
  Although our refusals to disturb the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decisions in Brown-Forman and International Shoe
did not themselves have any legal significance, see
Hopfmann v. Connolly, 471 U. S. 459, 460-461 (1985);
United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923), our
actions in those cases raised concerns that the broad
language of Northwestern States might ultimately be read
to suggest that a company whose only contacts with a State
consisted of sending -drummers- or salesmen into that
State could lawfully be subjected to (properly apportioned)
income taxation based on the interstate sales those repre-
sentatives generated.  In Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 409 U. S. 275 (1972), we reviewed the history
of 381 and noted that the complaints of the business
community over the uncertainty created by these cases were
the driving force behind the enactment of 381:
-`Persons engaged in interstate commerce are in doubt
as to the amount of local activities within a State that
will be regarded as forming a sufficient . . . connectio[n]
with the State to support the imposition of a tax on net
income from interstate operations and `properly appor-
tioned' to the State.'-  Id., at 280 (quoting S. Rep. No.
658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2-3 (1959)).
  Within months after our actions in these three cases,
Congress responded to the concerns that had been ex-
pressed by enacting Public Law 86-272, which established
what the relevant section heading referred to as a -mini-
mum standard- for imposition of a state net-income tax
based on solicitation of interstate sales:
     -No State . . . shall have power to impose, for any
taxable year . . ., a net income tax on the income
derived within such State by any person from inter-
state commerce if the only business activities within
such State by or on behalf of such person during such
taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
        -(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or
       his representative, in such State for sales of
       tangible personal property, which orders are sent
       outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if
       approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from
       a point outside the State; and
        -(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or
       his representative, in such State in the name of or
       for the benefit of a prospective customer of such
       person, if orders by such customer to such person
       to enable such customer to fill orders resulting
       from such solicitation are orders described in
       paragraph (1).-
     73 Stat. 555, 15 U. S. C. 381(a).
  Although we have stated that 381 was -designed to
define clearly a lower limit- for the exercise of state taxing
power, and that -Congress' primary goal- was to provide
-[c]larity that would remove [the] uncertainty- created by
Northwestern States, see Heublein, supra, at 280, experience
has proved 381's -minimum standard- to be somewhat less
than entirely clear.  The primary sources of confusion, in
this case as in others, have been two questions: (1) what is
the scope of the crucial term -solicitation of orders-; and
(2) whether there is a de minimis exception to the activity
(beyond -solicitation of orders-) that forfeits 381 immunity.
We address these issues in turn.
                      A
  Section 381(a)(1) confers immunity from state income
taxes on any company whose -only business activities- in
that State consist of -solicitation of orders- for interstate
sales.  -Solicitation,- commonly understood, means -[a]sk-
ing- for, or -enticing- to, something, see Black's Law
Dictionary 1393 (6th ed. 1990); Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 2169 (1981) (-solicit- means -to
approach with a request or plea (as in selling or begging)-).
We think it evident that in this statute the term includes,
not just explicit verbal requests for orders, but also any
speech or conduct that implicitly invites an order.  Thus, for
example, a salesman who extols the virtues of his com-
pany's product to the retailer of a competitive brand is
engaged in -solicitation- even if he does not come right out
and ask the retailer to buy some.  The key question in this
case is whether, and to what extent, -solicitation of orders-
covers activities that neither explicitly nor implicitly
propose a sale.
  In seeking the answer to that question, we reject the
proposition put forward by Wisconsin and its amici that we
must construe 381 narrowly because we said in Heublein
that -`unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the Federal-
State balance,'- 409 U. S., at 281-282 (citation omitted).
That principle-which we applied in Heublein to reject a
suggested inference from 381 that States cannot regulate
solicitation in a manner that might cause an out-of-state
company to forfeit its tax immunity-has no application in
the present case.  Because 381 unquestionably does limit
the power of States to tax companies whose only in-state
activity is -the solicitation of orders,- our task is simply to
ascertain the fair meaning of that term.  FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1990) (slip op., at 3-4).
  Wisconsin views some courts as having adopted the
position that an out-of-state company forfeits its 381
immunity if it engages in -any activity other than request-
ing the customer to purchase the product.-  Brief for
Petitioner 21; see also id., at 19, n. 8 (citing Hervey v. AMF
Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark. 147, 464 S. W. 2d 557 (1971); Clairol,
Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N. J. Super. 22, 262 A. 2d 213, aff'd, 57
N. J. 199, 270 A. 2d 702 (1970), appeal dism'd, 402 U. S.
902 (1971)).  Arguably supporting this interpretation is
subsection (c) of 381, which expands the immunity of
subsection (a) when the out-of-state seller does its market-
ing though independent contractors, to include not only
solicitation of orders for sales, but also actual sales, and in
addition -the maintenance . . . of an office . . . by one or
more independent contractors whose activities . . . consist
solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for sales . . . .-
The plain implication of this is that without that separate
indulgence the maintenance of an office for the exclusive
purpose of conducting the exempted solicitation and sales
would have provided a basis for taxation-i.e., that the
phrase -solicitation of orders- does not embrace the mainte-
nance of an office for the exclusive purpose of soliciting
orders.  Of course the phrase -solicitation of orders- ought
to be accorded a consistent meaning within the section, see
Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860
(1986), and if it does not embrace maintaining an office for
soliciting in subsection (c), it does not do so in subsection (a)
either.  One might argue that the necessity of special
permission for an office establishes that the phrase -solici-
tation of orders- covers only the actual requests for pur-
chases or, at most, the actions absolutely essential to
making those requests.
  We think, however, that would be an unreasonable
reading of the text.  That the statutory phrase uses the
term -solicitation- in a more general sense that includes not
merely the ultimate act of inviting an order but the entire
process associated with the invitation, is suggested by the
fact that 381 describes -the solicitation of orders- as a
subcategory, not of in-state acts, but rather of in-state
-business activities--a term that more naturally connotes
courses of conduct.  See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 22 (1981) (defining -activity- as -an occupation,
pursuit, or recreation in which a person is active-often
used in pl. <business activities>-).  Moreover, limiting
-solicitation of orders- to actual requests for purchases
would reduce 381(a)(1) to a nullity.  (It is obviously
impossible to make a request without some accompanying
action, such as placing a phone call or driving a car to the
customer's location.)  And limiting it to acts -essential- for
making requests would engender endless uncertainty,
contrary to the whole purpose of the statute.  (Is it
-essential- to use a company car, or to take a taxi, in order
to conduct in-person solicitation?  For that matter, is it
-essential- to solicit in person?)  It seems to us evident that
-solicitation of orders- embraces request-related activity
that is not even, strictly speaking, essential, or else it would
not cover salesmen's driving on the State's roads, spending
the night in the State's hotels, or displaying within the
State samples of their product.  We hardly think the statute
had in mind only day-trips into the taxing jurisdiction by
empty-handed drummers on foot.  See United States
Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 125, 140, 386 A. 2d
471, 478 (-Congress could hardly have intended to exempt
only walking solicitors-), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 880 (1978).
And finally, this extremely narrow interpretation of
-solicitation- would cause 381 to leave virtually unchanged
the law that existed before its enactment.  Both Brown-
Forman (where the salesman assisted wholesalers in
obtaining suitable displays for whiskey at retail stores) and
International Shoe (where hotel rooms were used to display
shoes) would be decided as they were before, upholding the
taxation.
  At the other extreme, Wrigley urges that we adopt a
broad interpretation of -solicitation- which it describes as
having been adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
based on that court's reading of cases in Pennsylvania and
New York, see 160 Wis. 2d, at 82, 465 N. W. 2d, at 811-812
(citing United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, supra;
Gillette Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 56 App. Div. 2d 475, 393
N. Y. S. 2d 186 (1977), aff'd, 45 N. Y. 2d 846, 382 N. E. 2d
764 (1978)).  See also Indiana Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 275 Ind. 378, 384, 416 N. E. 2d 1264, 1268
(1981).  According to Wrigley, this would treat as -solicita-
tion of orders- any activities that are -ordinary and neces-
sary `business activities' accompanying the solicitation
process- or are -routinely associated with deploying a sales
force to conduct the solicitation, so long as there is no office,
plant, warehouse or inventory in the State.-  Brief for
Respondent 9, 19-20; see also J. Hellerstein, State Taxation
-6.11[2], p. 245 (1983) (-solicitation ought to be held to
embrace other normal incidents of activities of salesmen- or
the -customary functions of sales representatives of out-of-
state merchants-).  We reject this -routinely-associated-
with-solicitation- or -customarily-performed-by-salesmen-
approach, since it converts a standard embracing only a
particular activity (-solicitation-) into a standard embracing
all activities routinely conducted by those who engage in
that particular activity (-salesmen-).  If, moreover, the
approach were to be applied (as respondent apparently
intends) on an industry-by-industry basis, it would render
the limitations of 381(a) toothless, permitting -solicitation
of orders- to be whatever a particular industry wants its
salesmen to do.
  In any case, we do not regard respondent's proposed
approach to be an accurate characterization of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court's opinion.  The Wisconsin court con-
strued -solicitation of orders- to reach only those activities
that are -closely associated- with solicitation, industry
practice being only one factor to be considered in judging
the -close[ness]- of the connection between the challenged
activity and the actual requests for orders.  160 Wis. 2d, at
82, 465 N. W. 2d, at 811-812.  The problem with that
standard, it seems to us, is that it merely reformulates
rather than answers the crucial question.  -What consti-
tutes the `solicitation of orders'?- becomes -What is `closely
related' to a solicitation request?-  This fails to provide the
-[c]larity that would remove uncertainty- which we identi-
fied as the primary goal of 381.  Heublein, 409 U. S.,
at 280.
  We proceed, therefore, to describe what we think the
proper standard to be.  Once it is acknowledged, as we have
concluded it must be, that -solicitation of orders- covers
more than what is strictly essential to making requests for
purchases, the next (and perhaps the only other) clear line
is the one between those activities that are entirely ancil-
lary to requests for purchases-those that serve no inde-
pendent business function apart from their connection to
the soliciting of orders-and those activities that the
company would have reason to engage in anyway but
chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force.  Cf. National
Tires, Inc. v. Lindley, 68 Ohio App. 2d 71, 78-79, 426
N. E. 2d 793, 798 (1980) (company's activities went beyond
solicitation to -functions more commonly related to main-
taining an on-going business-).  Providing a car and a stock
of free samples to salesmen is part of the -solicitation of
orders,- because the only reason to do it is to facilitate
requests for purchases.  Contrariwise, employing salesmen
to repair or service the company's products is not part of
the -solicitation of orders,- since there is good reason to get
that done whether or not the company has a sales force.
Repair and servicing may help to increase purchases; but it
is not ancillary to requesting purchases, and cannot be
converted into -solicitation- by merely being assigned to
salesmen.  See, e.g., Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
247 Ore. 404, 412, 430 P. 2d 998, 1001-1002 (1967)
(no 381 immunity for sales representatives' collection
activities).
  As we have discussed earlier, the text of the statute (the
-office- exception in subsection (c)) requires one exception to
this principle: Even if engaged in exclusively to facilitate
requests for purchases, the maintenance of an office within
the State, by the company or on its behalf, would go be-
yond the -solicitation of orders.-  We would not make any
more generalized exception to our immunity standard on
the basis of the -office- provision.  It seemingly represents
a judgment that a company office within a State is such
a significant manifestation of company -presence- that,
absent a specific exemption, income taxation should always
be allowed.  Jantzen, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 395 A. 2d
29, 32 (D.C. 1978); see generally Hellerstein, supra, -6.4.
  Wisconsin urges us to hold that no post-sale activities can
be included within the scope of covered -solicitation.-  We
decline to do so.  Activities that take place after a sale will
ordinarily not be entirely ancillary in the sense we have
described, see, e.g., Miles Laboratories v. Department of
Revenue, 274 Ore. 395, 400, 546 P. 2d 1081, 1083 (1976)
(replacing damaged goods), but we are not prepared to say
that will invariably be true.  Moreover, the pre-sale/post-
sale distinction is hopelessly unworkable.  Even if one
disregards the confusion that may exist concerning when
a sale takes place, cf. Uniform Commercial Code 2-401,
1A U. L. A. 675 (1989), manufacturers and distributors
ordinarily have ongoing relationships that involve continu-
ous sales, making it often impossible to determine whether
a particular incidental activity was related to the sale that
preceded it or the sale that followed it.
                      B
  The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that a company
does not necessarily forfeit its tax immunity under 381 by
performing some in-state business activities that go beyond
-solicitation of orders-; rather, it said, -[c]ourts should also
analyze- whether these additional activities were -`devia-
tions from the norm-' or -de minimis activities.-  160
Wis. 2d, at 82, 465 N. W. 2d, at 811 (citation omitted).
Wisconsin asserts that the plain language of the statute
bars this recognition of a de minimis exception, because the
immunity is limited to situations where -the only business
activities within [the] State- are those described, 15
U. S. C. 381 (emphasis added).  This ignores the fact that
the venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex (-the law
cares not for trifles-) is part of the established background
of legal principles against which all enactments are adopt-
ed, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication)
are deemed to accept.  See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 50_ U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 10);
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op.,
at 7); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977); Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425
U. S. 1, 18 (1976); Industrial Assn. of San Francisco v.
United States, 268 U. S. 64, 84 (1925).  It would be especial-
ly unreasonable to abandon normal application of the de
minimis principle in construing 381, which operates in
such stark, all-or-nothing fashion: A company either has
complete net-income tax immunity or it has none at all,
even for its solicitation activities.  Wisconsin's reading of
the statute renders a company liable for hundreds of
thousands of dollars in taxes if one of its salesmen sells a
10- item in-state.  Finally, Wisconsin is wrong in asserting
that application of the de minimis principle -excise[s] the
word `only' from the statute.-  Brief for Petitioner 27.  The
word -only- places a strict limit upon the categories of
activities that are covered by 381, not upon their substan-
tiality.  See, e.g., Drackett Prods. Co. v. Conrad, 370
N. W. 2d 723, 726 (N. D. 1985); Kimberly Clark, 275 Ind.,
at 383-384, 416 N. E. 2d, at 1268.
  Whether a particular activity is a de minimis deviation
from a prescribed standard must, of course, be determined
with reference to the purpose of the standard.  Section 381
was designed to increase-beyond what Northwestern States
suggested was required by the Constitution-the connection
that a company could have with a State before subjecting
itself to tax.  Accordingly, whether in-state activity other
than -solicitation of orders- is sufficiently de minimis to
avoid loss of the tax immunity conferred by 381 depends
upon whether that activity establishes a nontrivial addition-
al connection with the taxing State.
                     III
  Wisconsin asserts that at least six activities performed by
Wrigley within its borders went beyond the -solicitation of
orders-: the replacement of stale gum by sales representa-
tives; the supplying of gum through -agency stock checks-;
the storage of gum, racks, and promotional materials; the
rental of space for storage; the regional manager's recruit-
ment, training, and evaluation of employees; and the
regional manager's intervention in credit disputes.  Since
none of these activities can reasonably be viewed as
requests for orders covered by 381, Wrigley was subject to
tax unless they were either ancillary to requesting orders
or de minimis.
  We conclude that the replacement of stale gum, the
supplying of gum through -agency stock checks,- and the
storage of gum were not ancillary.  As to the first: Wrigley
would wish to attend to the replacement of spoiled product
whether or not it employed a sales force.  Because that
activity serves an independent business function quite
separate from requesting orders, it does not qualify for
381 immunity.  Miles Laboratories, 274 Ore., at 400, 546
P. 2d, at 1083.  Although Wrigley argues that gum replace-
ment was a -promotional necessity- designed to ensure
continued sales, Brief for Respondent 31, it is not enough
that the activity facilitate sales; it must facilitate the
requesting of sales, which this did not.
  The provision of gum through -agency stock checks-
presents a somewhat more complicated question.  It
appears from the record that this activity occurred only in
connection with the furnishing of display racks to retailers,
so that it was arguably ancillary to a form of consumer
solicitation.  Section 381(a)(2) shields a manufacturer's
-missionary- request that an indirect customer (such as a
consumer) place an order, if a successful request would
ultimately result in an order's being filled by a 381
-customer- of the manufacturer, i.e., by the wholesaler who
fills the orders of the retailer with goods shipped to the
wholesaler from out-of-state.  Cf. Gillette, 56 App. Div. 2d,
at 482, 393 N. Y. S. 2d, at 191 (-Advice to retailers on the
art of displaying goods to the public can hardly be more
thoroughly solicitation . . .-).  It might seem, therefore, that
setting up gum-filled display racks, like Wrigley's general
advertising in Wisconsin, would be immunized by
381(a)(2).  What destroys this analysis, however, is the
fact that Wrigley made the retailers pay for the gum,
thereby providing a business purpose for supplying the gum
quite independent from the purpose of soliciting consumers.
Since providing the gum was not entirely ancillary to
requesting purchases, it was not within the scope of
-solicitation of orders.-  And because the vast majority of
the gum stored by Wrigley in Wisconsin was used in
connection with stale gum swaps and agency stock checks,
that storage (and the indirect rental of space for that
storage) was in no sense ancillary to -solicitation.-
  By contrast, Wrigley's in-state recruitment, training, and
evaluation of sales representatives and its use of hotels and
homes for sales-related meetings served no purpose apart
from their role in facilitating solicitation.  The same must
be said of the instances in which Wrigley's regional sales
manager contacted the Chicago office about -rather nasty-
credit disputes involving important accounts in order to -get
the account and [Wrigley's] credit department communicat-
ing,- App. 71, 72.  It hardly appears likely that this mediat-
ing function between the customer and the central office
would have been performed by some other employee-some
company ombudsman, so to speak-if the on-location sales
staff did not exist.  The purpose of the activity, in other
words, was to ingratiate the salesman with the customer,
thereby facilitating requests for purchases.
  Finally, Wrigley argues that the various nonimmune
activities, considered singly or together, are de minimis.  In
particular, Wrigley emphasizes that the gum sales through
-agency stock checks- accounted for only 0.00007% of
Wrigley's annual Wisconsin sales, and in absolute terms
amounted to only several hundred dollars a year.  We need
not decide whether any of the nonimmune activities was de
minimis in isolation; taken together, they clearly are not.
Wrigley's sales representatives exchanged stale gum, as a
matter of regular company policy, on a continuing basis,
and Wrigley maintained a stock of gum worth several thou-
sand dollars in the State for this purpose as well as for the
less frequently pursued (but equally unprotected) purpose
of selling gum through -agency stock checks.-  Although the
relative magnitude of these activities was not large com-
pared to Wrigley's other operations in Wisconsin, we have
little difficulty concluding that they constituted a nontrivial
additional connection with the State.  Because Wrigley's
business activities within Wisconsin were not limited to
those specified in 381, the prohibition on net-income
taxation contained in that provision was inapplicable.
                *     *     *
  Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                            It is so ordered.